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the index calculation assumes that their
value increased 3 percent in the first year
after the sale transaction. Both houses
were put back on the market and sold in
2003, and we have direct observations of
their resale values ($280,000 and
$730,000, respectively). Given the first-
year appreciation of 3 percent, House B
must have appreciated 8 percent between
2002 and 2003 to reach its $280,000
resale value. Similarly, House C must
have appreciated 10 percent during the
same period to reach its $730,000 resale
value. We now have two estimates of the
2002–03 appreciation rate, 8 percent and
10 percent. In calculating our index, we
will take the average and assume that
home prices in Anytown appreciated 9
percent in 2002–03. Setting our index to
100 in 2001, our reference year, we can
now calculate the index values in later
years, namely, 103 in 2002 (3 percent
growth) and 113 in 2003 (an additional 9
percent growth).
■ Data Quality
Building an index is never as simple as
the example above suggests. The prob-
lem is that although the house-price
indices are meant to capture the market
value change of all homes in a specific
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Until recently, homeowners had no
way to protect the value of their
homes against losses that could 
result from housing market down-
turns. With the derivatives contracts
introduced by the CME last year,
homeowners now have some means
of protection, and new and better
products are more likely to follow
from them.
The fast-paced appreciation of home
prices in recent years made residential
real estate the second-largest class of
assets owned by U.S. households in
2006, comprising 34 percent of their
assets (by comparison, stocks comprised
27 percent and bonds 39 percent that
year), up from 24 percent in 2000. 
Typically, real estate holdings are also
highly leveraged, so fluctuations in
housing prices result in much bigger
fluctuations in homeowners’net worth.
If home prices decline, as some predict,
homeowners may have considerable
exposure to the real estate market’s
downside risks, yet they can do little to
protect themselves from such volatility.
This is about to change. On May 16,
2006, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
began trading two new derivatives con-
tracts, a futures contract and an option
on the futures contract, which create the
ability to invest in residential real estate
without having to actually buy or sell 
a house. The value of these two new
derivatives is based on the Case–Shiller
Home Price Indices, developed by Karl
Case and Robert Shiller in the 1980s.
There are 20 regional indices and a com-
posite index that is calculated using the
regional indices. The regional indices
follow the value of home prices in 20
large U.S. metropolitan areas (Atlanta,
Boston, Charlotte, Chicago, Cleveland,
Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Las Vegas, 
Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New
York, Phoenix, Portland, San Diego, 
San Francisco, Seattle, Tampa, and
Washington, D.C.) by tracking the resale 
values of homes in each market. At this
time, derivatives contracts are available
for only 10 of the metro areas, but they
will eventually be available for all 
areas. Other companies (Moody’s, for
example) calculate home price indices
for other regions using the Case–Shiller
methodology as well.
In this Economic Commentary, I explain
how these indices are constructed and
why they are better at tracking housing
prices than some alternative measures
cited in the financial media. I also
explain how derivatives based on the
indices—and some potential products
which financial firms might use the
derivatives to create, including home
equity insurance, can protect homeown-
ers against the volatility of residential
real estate prices. 
■ Case–Shiller Home Price
Indices: The Basics
At the simplest level, the Case–Shiller
Indices are based on changes in individ-
ual single-family home prices as
observed through the repeat sale of the
same structures over time. 
Box 1 contains a simple example of 
how the index can be calculated for
Anytown, USA. Between 2001 and
2003, three single-family homes have
been sold in Anytown. House A was
purchased in 2001 for $300,000, but its
owner put it on the market again the 
following year and sold it for $310,000,
a 3 percent gain. (All growth rates are
rounded to the nearest full percentage
point.) Since this is the only instance of
a repeat sale (that is, two observable sale
transactions for the same house) in our
sample from the 2001–02 period, we
will assume that all home prices rose 
3 percent between 2001 and 2002.
Houses B and C were also on the market
in 2001 and were sold for $250,000 
and $640,000, respectively. We cannot
observe their values in 2002 directly, butarea, the calculations must be based on
the observed changes in the value of a
small group of recently purchased
homes. A statistician who tries to infer
the marketwide price change from the
sale of one house faces a major issue:
What fraction of the observed change in
the house’s value results from market
factors and what fraction from house-
specific factors? For example, how do
we know that an observed decline in the
value of a house is the result of deterio-
rating market conditions rather than the
poor maintenance of that particular
house? Because the condition of the
house cannot be inferred from the sale
records, one could easily make errors by
generalizing from a few sales to the
entire market. Or consider the case of a
father who is transferring the title of his
second home to his newly married son.
Although the transaction may show up
as a sale in the title records, the father
may have set the price at a deep dis-
count relative to the market value as a
wedding present. The problem in this
case is that the transaction data do not
show the motives of the buyer and the
seller, yet including this price in the
index calculations would clearly be mis-
leading. So the challenge is to identify
the wrong or misleading observations
and to figure out what to do with them. 
This is a big challenge. Some problems
can be solved relatively easily. For
example, if the buyer and the seller have
the same last name, the sale is probably
among family members and the price
does not reflect the house’s market value
as it would be set by a buyer and a seller
who are acting in their own best eco-
nomic interest. Some other problems,
such as the lack of information about the
house’s condition, can be alleviated by
statistical means but never fully resolved.
Despite their potential weaknesses, the
Case–Shiller Indices are still an improve-
ment over other house price indices com-
monly cited in the media, one published
by the Office of Federal Housing Enter-
prise Oversight (OFHEO) and another by
the National Association of Realtors
(NAR). (Freddie Mac also has an index
that is very similar to the one published
by OFHEO.)
■ Other Price Indices 
The Case–Shiller, OFHEO, and NAR
indices differ in fundamental ways. The
NAR Index does not use a repeat sales
methodology but tracks existing homes’
median value—the value at which half 
of the home values in an area are worth
more and half are worth less. But the
median can easily be biased by new
housing construction in an area. New
homes for high-income people will pull
the median up, while new homes for
low-income people will push it down. 
As a result, the index will capture
changes in the median price that are
related not to changes in home values
but to changes in the composition of the
housing stock.
The OFHEO Index resembles the
Case–Shiller Indices in that it utilizes
the repeat sales methodology; that is, it
tracks the value of individual homes that
are resold over time. Its weakness is that
it is based solely on houses whose mort-
gages are purchased by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. This prevents the index
from representing the entire housing
stock of the community. For example,
the mortgage of the house that is being
followed must be less than Fannie and
Freddie’s conforming loan limit—
$417,000 for a single-family home in
2006. To put this limit into perspective,
note that the median home price in 
New York City is around $450,000.
With 10 percent down, the median
house would require a $405,000 mort-
gage. So the OFHEO Index for New
York City could conceivably ignore
almost half the housing units in the area.
An even larger share of housing units
would be left out of the calculations in
San Francisco, where the median price
is about $750,000.
These differences in methodology have 
a significant impact on the behavior of
each index (figure 1). Relative to the
OFHEO and NAR indices, the Case–
Shiller Composite Index indicates a
much more severe decline in home
prices in the early 1990s and a much
stronger appreciation in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. Note that the Case–
Shiller Composite Index is not a national
index, because it includes only 10 metro
areas. However, the indices for individ-
ual metro area also show the same trend.
■ Home Price Derivatives
Because the housing futures and options
that are being traded on the CME are
based on a more accurate price index,
they offer investors and homeowners
new opportunities that did not exist
before. But the opportunity to hedge
against the loss of a home’s value may
not come to homeowners by buying the
derivatives directly. Instead, homeown-
ers are more likely to find new products,
like home-equity insurance, available to
them, which have been made possible
by the availability of the derivatives to
financial intermediaries. To see why,
let’s take a closer look at the CME’s
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Standard &Poor's S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Indices.by issuing a futures contract based on
the regional index covering his city.
Because the Case–Shiller Indices track
entire metropolitan areas and not indi-
vidual neighborhoods, they will not be
perfectly correlated with the value of
any particular house. For example, if a
golf course in a Boston suburb is turned
into a strip mall, it may depress home
prices in the area, but on a larger scale,
Boston metropolitan prices are unlikely
to register any significant drop for that
single reason. Consequently, a home-
owner in the Boston area gets only par-
tial protection by issuing the Boston
futures contract.
As the market develops, more cus-
tomized contracts may be created, but it
will still be prohibitively expensive to
create nonstandard market-traded secu-
rities that cater to each homeowner’s
particular needs. According to finance
theory, this is where financial intermedi-
aries (in this case, insurance companies)
come in. Intermediaries position them-
selves between financial markets that
can only trade in standardized (metro-
politan area-level) contracts and individ-
uals who need contracts with highly
idiosyncratic payoff structures. They
transform standardized contracts in the
financial markets into retail financial
products for end-users. 
Consider an insurance product that
gives the Boston homeowner complete
protection if home values in his neigh-
borhood deteriorate at a time when his
house is on the market. Now, suppose
that the insurance company sold this
product to thousands of homeowners 
in Boston. Obviously, some home prices
will increase and some will decline;
however, because the insurer has such
widespread exposure to the overall 
market, the vagaries of individual home
prices will cancel each other out and the
insurer’s liabilities will closely track
price movements at the metropolitan
level. Now the insurer can cap its down-
side risk at any desired level by issuing
a CME futures contract based on the
Boston index. If home prices drop in
Boston, the futures contract will pay 
the insurer compensation proportional
to the level of the decline and will limit
the insurer’s losses. If home prices rise,
the premiums paid by homeowners will
compensate the insurer for his losses 
in the futures market. So while the new
derivatives are an imperfect answer to
homeowners’needs, financial intermedi-
aries have the ability to use standardized
derivatives contracts to create retail
insurance products for homeowners.
■ Room for Growth
Despite the many benefits of the home-
price derivatives identified in this 
Commentary, the trading volume in 
this nascent market is still tiny. The
notional value of all outstanding
futures contracts (the value of the
underlying assets at the spot price) 
was slightly above $77 million in
August 2006.
The market’s growth should depend
partly on the speed with which insur-
ance companies can create and sell
retail products to end-users (home-
owners), which would in turn stimulate
insurance companies’demand for
derivative securities to use for hedging
purposes. Developing retail insurance
products, obtaining regulatory
approval, and marketing these products
to consumers will obviously take time.
The encouraging news for the market 
is that experiments in home-equity 
protection began well before the cre-
ation of derivative contracts. In 2002,
Syracuse, New York, joined forces with
local and national nonprofit community
development organizations, financial
institutions, and the Yale School of
Management to create a local home-
equity-protection product funded by a
HUD grant. Given the effort that has
already gone into the development and
local testing of the product, it seems
possible that flyers advertising home
equity insurance may soon be showing
up in your mailbox.
■ Footnotes
1. With larger down payments and 
piggyback secondary mortgages, the
first mortgage of homes priced much
higher than $450,000 could be brought
below the conforming mortgage limit.
In that case, the OFHEO Index would
capture a greater share of the housing
stock.  Still, the problem remains.
■ Recommended Reading
Andrew Caplin, William Goetzmann,
Eric Hangen, Barry Nalebuff, Elisabeth
Prentice, John Rodkin, Matthew
Spiegel, and Tom Skinner. 2003.
“Home Equity Insurance: A Pilot 
Project,” Yale ICF Working Paper No.
03-12.
futures contracts. (For the sake of
brevity, I will not discuss options here.
For information on the various applica-
tions and pricing of futures, options,
and options on futures contracts, see the
recommended readings.)
In a futures contract, the issuer and the
holder mutually promise to exchange a
fixed quantity of the underlying asset 
at a predetermined date (delivery or 
settlement date) and a predetermined
(futures) price. If the asset’s market
price exceeds the futures price on the
delivery date, the contract holder
receives the asset at a below-market
price and makes a profit. If the market
price is lower, the contract holder is still
obligated to buy the asset at the futures
price, in which case the issuer makes
money. In practice, these contracts are
settled using cash in lieu of the asset. So
if a homeowner sold a futures contract
on his house and home values fall, he
would receive a sum of cash equivalent
to the profit he would have made by
selling his house at the futures price; in
other words, the contract protects him
against price declines in the spot mar-
ket. On the other hand, if home values
rise, he must pay the contract holder the
difference between the market price and
the futures price.
The important observation that arises
from this discussion is that a home-
owner who lives in one of the 10 major
metropolitan areas covered by the
Case–Shiller Indices could insure him-
self against a marketwide price decline
Box 1: Home Sales in Anytown, USA
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